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ABSTRACT 
  In this Note, the Author analyzes the current state of Denali KidCare. The 
Author summarizes the history of state-provided health insurance for 
children and the particular difficulties associated with providing health care 
in Alaska. In light of the recent passage of the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act in 2009, the Author then investigates the 
increased incentives for states to expand health care coverage to more 
children and describes Alaska’s failure to take advantage of these 
opportunities. The Article concludes with an argument in favor of specific 
steps that would allow Alaska to provide health care to as many children as 
possible at the lowest cost. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alaska—The Last Frontier—has been a place where people go to 
hide, to escape, to live in seclusion and free of intrusion. Such desires 
are made possible by a land that is one-fifth the size of the United States, 
and larger than Texas, California, and Montana combined.1 A land of 
such tremendous proportions allows for a population density of 1.07 
persons per square mile.2 Such a vast and unsettled land, however, leads 
to many costs. 
Alaska depends on world demand for its products, including oil, 
fish, minerals, and timber.3 Dependence on such commodities results in 
booms and busts, seasonal employment, and general instability.4 These 
factors, together with the state’s geography, make providing health care 
in Alaska particularly difficult and problematic—both in terms of 
quality and cost. 
For example, as of 2007, Alaska’s unique situation has resulted in 
an insurance market where two companies control ninety-five percent 
of the market.5 Such a market leads to a state of affairs where certain 
low-income residents—too wealthy for Medicaid—could have to pay up 
to twenty percent of their incomes for health insurance.6 It is simple 
enough to understand that when families have to choose between 
buying insurance costing twenty percent of their income and having no 
insurance at all, the result will be many uninsured families and children. 
In Alaska, around 18,000 children are uninsured.7 
The federal government has been aware of this problem, which has 
arisen in many states. In response, it enacted the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (S-CHIP)—now called “CHIP”—which the Obama 
administration reauthorized in the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA).8 But Alaska is failing its 
families and children by not taking full advantage of the benefits 
provided under CHIPRA to help families too wealthy for Medicaid but 
 
 1. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS. STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN 5, 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/AK 
CurrentStatePlan.pdf [hereinafter STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN]. 
 2. Id. 
  3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. AM. MED. ASS’N, COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE 7 (2007). 
 6. See STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE HEALTH ACCESS 
PROFILE: ALASKA 1 (2007), available at http://www.shadac.org/files/shadac/ 
states/profiles/alaska_0.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
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too poor to afford private coverage.9 The federal government is sending 
Alaska lifeboats to help insure its children, but Alaska has chosen to 
reject them. 
This Note will argue that Alaska needs to change its CHIP laws 
and policies to better suit low-income children and families. Part I 
provides the background and origins of S-CHIP. Part II addresses 
CHIPRA and the changes it established in the system—specifically in 
terms of finance and outreach. Parts III and IV address Alaska’s 
background and health care situation. Part V describes Denali 
KidCare—Alaska’s CHIP. Finally, Part VI provides analysis for what 
Alaska needs to do to exploit CHIPRA fully and efficiently to provide 
low-income Alaskan families with maximum benefits. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PROGRAM 
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter introduced the Child Health 
Assessment Program to Congress—a major piece of legislation designed 
to improve health services for children of low-income families.10 In the 
late 1980s, budget legislation phased in Medicaid coverage for children 
in poverty.11 Additionally, states extended coverage to children and 
parents at higher income levels through Medicaid options and 
demonstration waivers.12 By 1997, around twenty-one million children 
were enrolled in Medicaid.13 
In 1997, President Clinton focused his efforts on a 
disproportionately uninsured group: families too wealthy for Medicaid 
but too poor to afford private insurance.14 This group fell between 100% 
and 200% of the poverty line.15 What resulted were proposals of 
different types. For example, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ted 
Kennedy (D-Mass.) proposed comprehensive coverage, while other 
senators proposed expanding Medicaid.16 The final product was the 
State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP), established by the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and enacted under Title XXI of the Social 
Security Act.17 Professor Lambrew18 described S-CHIP as “a fine 
 
 9. See infra Part VI. 
 10. Health Care Legislation Message to the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 717 
(April 25, 1977). 
 11. JEANNE M. LAMBREW, THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1 (2007). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
PROGRAM 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/80xx/doc8092/05-
10-SCHIP.pdf. 
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balance—hard wrought but designed to maintain equilibrium between 
states and the federal government as well as political conservatives and 
liberals.”19 
States were charged with administering S-CHIP within broad 
federal guidelines, and states and the federal government jointly 
financed it.20 States were given great flexibility in designing their 
programs.21 For example, in 2006, twenty-six states had eligibility 
thresholds at 200% of the poverty level and nine had thresholds at less 
than 200%; states went as low as 140% and as high as 350%.22 The 
poverty guidelines are issued each year by the Department of Health 
and Human Services.23 In 2009, the poverty guideline for a family of 
four in the forty-eight contiguous states and Washington, D.C. was 
$22,050.24 For a family of four in Alaska, the poverty guideline for 2009 
was $27,570.25 
States were able to administer S-CHIP in three different ways: (1) 
by expanding Medicaid to cover ineligible children; (2) by creating a 
separate program under S-CHIP; or (3) through some combination of 
the first two methods.26 If a state chose to expand Medicaid, it had to 
provide the same benefits as were already provided under the Medicaid 
program and had to apply the same rules and regulations.27 If a state 
chose to create a separate program under S-CHIP, it was subject to 
minimum standards set by the federal government.28 
Federal funding for S-CHIP was allocated based on a formula 
taking into account the number of children in low-income families, the 
number of uninsured children, and the wages in health services.29 This 
method gave the most funding to states with the greatest number of 
uninsured children, but it caused major distribution imbalances.30 Some 
states with a high number of uninsured low-income children received 
too much money—more than they were spending—and some states 
received too little.31 
 
 18. Professor Lambrew is an associate professor of Public Affairs and 
director of the Health and Human Services Office of Health Reform at the 
University of Texas at Austin. 
 19. LAMBREW, supra note 11, at 2. 
 20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 
4199 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, MORE FUNDING FOR CHIP, DIFFERENT 
RULES: HOW DOES CHIPRA CHANGE CHIP FUNDING? 3 (2009), available at http:// 
www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/chipra/funding.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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States were required to provide matching funds and were given 
three years to spend their federal allotment; if a state did not spend its 
federal allotment, the leftover money would be redistributed to a state 
that had exhausted its allotment.32 To incentivize state participation, the 
federal government paid a higher share of the spending on S-CHIP than 
it did in Medicaid.33 The federal government’s matching rate varied 
between states from sixty-five percent to eighty-three percent, compared 
to fifty percent to seventy-six percent for Medicaid spending.34 S-CHIP 
also differed from Medicaid in that it was not an entitlement program 
without limits on spending; S-CHIP was a grant program with federal 
spending capped in advance.35 
S-CHIP was successful in reducing the number of low-income 
uninsured children. In the last decade, as a result of Medicaid and S-
CHIP—combined with states expanding eligibility and adopting 
streamlined enrollment procedures—the percentage of low-income 
uninsured children decreased by one-third.36 In 2007, states were 
continuing to improve S-CHIP coverage for low-income uninsured 
children.37 Of the twenty states that expanded S-CHIP eligibility, twelve 
raised the income eligibility limits to 300% of the poverty guideline.38 S-
CHIP reauthorization was not seamless. President George W. Bush 
vetoed two versions of legislation reauthorizing S-CHIP; in the end, S-
CHIP was temporarily extended through March 31, 2009.39 
II.  CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 
REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
S-CHIP expired at the end of fiscal year 2007.40 But, on February 4, 
2009, President Obama signed the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) into law—it went into effect 
April 1, 2009.41 President Obama called CHIPRA a “down payment on 
[the] commitment to cover every single American.”42 CHIPRA’s 
purpose is to “provide dependable and stable funding for children’s 
 
 32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at VII. 
 33. Id. at VIII. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. DONNA COHEN ROSS & CARYN MARKS, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID 
AND THE UNINSURED, CHALLENGES OF PROVIDING HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS IN A RECESSION 3 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/upload/7855.pdf. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 17, at 13. 
 41. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 42. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Overview National CHIP 
Policy, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy (last visited Apr. 10, 
2010). 
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health insurance . . . in order to enroll all six million uninsured children 
who are eligible, but not enrolled . . . .”43 
A. Financing 
CHIPRA extends funding for the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) through 2013.44 The total allotments given to states 
under CHIPRA are as follows: fiscal year 2009, $10,562,000,000; fiscal 
year 2010, $12,520,000,000; fiscal year 2011, $13,459,000,000; fiscal year 
2012, $14,982,000,000; and for fiscal year 2013, there will be two semi-
annual payments of $2,850,000,000.45 In addition to increasing the total 
amount of funds available to the states, CHIPRA changed the allotment 
formula to distribute funds more efficiently.46 
For fiscal years 2009 and 2010, allotments will not take into account 
how much the states spent in the past, so all states will receive more 
money than they have in the past.47 But, beginning in 2011, allotments 
will be based on how much states previously spent. For example, the 
2011 allotment will be based on how much states spend in 2010.48 This 
method of allotting funds based on past usage incentivizes states to 
increase enrollment in the program; if they do not, they will lose funds. 
For fiscal year 2010, allotments will be calculated based on the amount 
of the state’s allotment in 2009 plus the amount of funds paid to cure 
shortfalls, multiplied by the allotment increase factor.49 The allotment 
increase factor will help prevent shortfalls from occurring by taking into 
account expansion in health care costs and increases in the number of 
children in each state. 
States have two years—instead of the three years given under S-
CHIP—to spend their annual allotments.50 If a state does not expend its 
entire allotment, the unused funds will be redistributed to “shortfall 
states.”51 Shortfall states are those with approved child health plans and 
whose projected expenditures under such plan exceed the sum of: the 
remaining funds from the previous year, the amount of the child 
enrollment contingency fund payments, and the amount of the state’s 
allotment for the fiscal year.52 
 
 43. Pub. L. No. 111-3 § 2. 
 44. Id. § 101. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(a) (2006). 
 46. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 4. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(m)(2)(A)(i) (2006). The allotment increase factor, 
commonly referred to as the “inflation factor,” is calculated with a formula: ((1 + 
the percentage increase in per capita national health expenditures over the last 
year) × (1 + the percentage increase in the number of children in the state over 
the last year)). 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(m)(5) (2006). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(e)(1) (2006). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(f)(1) (2006). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(f)(2) (2006). 
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To prevent against shortfalls, CHIPRA provides for a contingency 
fund. CHIPRA establishes a fund in the federal Treasury known as the 
“Child Enrollment Contingency Fund” (the “Fund”).53 The Fund is 
comprised of money from the Treasury that is not otherwise 
appropriated; enough will be appropriated to the Fund as is necessary 
to make payments to eligible shortfall states.54 But there is a cap to the 
contingency fund payments—the total amount available for payment 
each year cannot exceed twenty percent of the year’s CHIP allotment.55 
If the total state CHIP shortfalls exceed the amount available for 
distribution in the Fund, then whatever money is in the Fund will be 
proportionately distributed among the shortfall states.56 If the 
contingency fund payment cap is not met in any given year, the excess 
will be made available for performance bonus payments, discussed 
below, to offset additional Medicaid and CHIP enrollment costs 
resulting from enrollment and retention efforts.57 
To receive money from the Fund, a state must demonstrate that its 
CHIP expenditures are greater than its allotment for the respective year 
and that it will exceed its CHIP enrollment target.58 The target number 
of children enrolled is determined by increasing the number of children 
enrolled from the previous year by the population growth factor.59 If a 
state qualifies for contingency payments, the amount of money received 
is based on the amount by which the enrollees exceed the enrollment 
target and the per capita cost of CHIP coverage in the state multiplied 
by the Enhanced Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAPs).60 
FMAPs are used to determine the amount of funds the federal 
government will match for state expenditures. The FMAP for any state 
is 100%, less the percentage that is provided by the state.61 For example, 
if a state provides forty-five cents, the federal government will pay fifty-
five cents. CHIP’s FMAP—called the “enhanced FMAP” because it is a 
higher federal contribution percentage than the regular FMAP, which 
applies to Medicaid—is capped at eighty-five percent.62 This means that 
the maximum the federal government may contribute is eighty-five 
cents for every fifteen cents a state provides. The enhanced FMAP, 
however, does not apply to all state CHIP expenditures. If a state 
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(1) (2006). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(A) (2006). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(B) (2006). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2) (2006). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(2)(D) (2006). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3) (2006). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3)(B) (2006). The child population growth factor is 
equal to one plus the percentage increase in child population of the state from 
July 1 in the previous year to July 1 in the fiscal year involved. 42 U.S.C. § 
1397dd(m)(5). The percentage increase is itself determined by starting with the 
most recent Bureau of the Census estimates before the year involved and then 
adding one percentage point. Id. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 1397dd(n)(3)(A) (2006). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006).  
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(b) (2006).  
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decides to include children whose families earn more than 300% of the 
poverty line, the FMAP, rather than the enhanced FMAP, will apply.63 
There is one exception: if a state had an approved program before 
CHIPRA’s enactment that included children over the 300% poverty line, 
then such a state is excluded from the cap.64 
To incentivize states to enroll as many children as possible, 
CHIPRA has added a bonus payment system.65 The bonus system 
rewards states that are successful at enrolling low-income children in 
Medicaid. This incentive exists because states need to be encouraged to 
enroll the lowest-income children.66 Because of the higher federal 
matching rate for CHIP relative to Medicaid, it costs a state more to 
cover the lowest-income children under Medicaid. 
States qualify for this bonus based on enrollments exceeding target 
levels. The target level for 2009 is equal to the number of children 
enrolled in 2007, increased by the population growth for children in the 
state from 2007 to 2008 plus four percentage points, and further 
increased by the population growth for children in the state from 2008 
to 2009, plus four percentage points.67 For 2010–2012, the target levels 
are based on the number of child enrollees for the state during the 
previous year, increased by the population growth for children in the 
state during the year, plus 3.5 percentage points.68 The statute also 
provides guidelines for the targets from 2013–2015, as well as for 
subsequent years.69 
In addition to surpassing the target levels, states must meet at least 
five of eight criteria to qualify for the bonus payments.70 These criteria 
are: (1) continuous eligibility (thirty states comply with this 
criterion71)—meaning the state has elected to provide enrolled children 
continuous eligibility for a full twelve months;72 (2) liberalization of 
asset requirements (thirty-six states)—meaning either the state does not 
apply any asset or resource test for eligibility, or the state permits a 
guardian to provide information relating to family assets and the state 
takes steps to verify the assets other than by requiring documentation 
from the guardian;73 (3) elimination of an in-person interview 
requirement (thirty-eight states)—meaning the state does not require the 
application or renewal to be made in person, nor does the state require a 
 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(8)(A) (2006). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(8)(B) (2006). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3) (2006). 
 66. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 9. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(I) (2006).  
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(II) (2006). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(C)(iii)(III)–(IV) (2006). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4) (2006). 
 71. All figures for the number of states complying with each criterion come 
from: JENNIFER SULLIVAN, FAMILIES USA, COVERING MORE CHILDREN, REWARDING 
SUCCESS: STATE PERFORMANCE BONUSES, 6–7 (2009), available at http://www. 
familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/chipra/state-performance-bonuses.pdf. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
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face-to-face interview, unless there are discrepancies;74 (4) use of a joint 
application for Medicaid and CHIP (thirty-five states)—meaning only 
one application is used for Medicaid and CHIP for both establishing and 
renewing eligibility;75 (5) automatic renewal (fourteen states)—meaning 
the state provides a pre-printed form, completed by the state based on 
information available to the state, notifying the parent that eligibility of 
the child will be renewed and continued based on such information, 
unless the state is provided other information;76 (6) presumptive 
eligibility for children (nine states)—meaning children who appear 
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP will be presumed eligible at certain 
qualified locations and can receive up to sixty days of coverage while a 
formal determination is made;77 (7) express lane—meaning the state has 
exercised its option to use a finding from an “Express Lane” agency78 
(an agency that the state’s CHIP agency has determined is eligible to 
make determinations of one or more eligibility requirements);79 (8) 
premium assistance subsidies (fourteen states)—meaning the state has 
elected to implement the option of providing premium assistance 
subsidies (a way of putting CHIP or Medicaid dollars toward a family’s 
employer-provided insurance coverage).80 
If a state both exceeds its targets and meets at least five of the eight 
criteria, it qualifies for per-child bonuses for all children enrolled in 
Medicaid above the Medicaid enrollment target.81 States exceeding their 
enrollment target by ten percent or less—referred to in the statute as 
“first tier”—are awarded a bonus of fifteen percent of the projected per 
capita state Medicaid expenditures for every child above the target.82 
For example, if State X has a per capita Medicaid expenditure of $4000 
(including both federal and state contributions), and State X has a fifty 
percent FMAP, then State X’s share is $2000; the first-tier-bonus 
payment would be fifteen percent of the state’s share—$300 in this 
example—for every child above the target. Therefore, if State X enrolled 
1000 children above the target, it would receive $300 per child for a total 
of $300,000. 
States exceeding the target by more than ten percent—second tier—
are awarded a bonus of 62.5% of the projected per capita state Medicaid 
expenditures for every child above the first tier cutoff.83 For example, 
assume that those 1000 children represent the state exceeding its target 
 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(C) (2006). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(D) (2006). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(E) (2006). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(F) (2006); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 7 
tbl.2 (citing ROSS & MARKS, supra note 36). 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(13)(F) (2006). This was a new provision as of 2009, so 
no state had yet implemented the “express lane” option. See SULLIVAN, supra 
note 71, at 7 tbl.2. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(G) (2006). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(H) (2006). 
 81. SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 10. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). 
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by exactly ten percent. If State X had actually exceeded its enrollment 
target by 1250 children—that is, by 12.5%—then State X would receive 
the first tier bonus for the first 1000 children and would receive 62.5% of 
the state expenditures for the 250 children by which the state enrollment 
exceeded the first tier cutoff. In this scenario, State X would receive the 
first tier bonus of $300,000, plus $312,500 ($1250 (62.5% of $2000) 
multiplied by 250 (number of children above ten percent of the target)) 
for a grand total of $612,500. 
B. Outreach and Enrollment 
In its efforts to expand health coverage for low-income children 
who are eligible but not enrolled, CHIPRA created a $100 million 
outreach fund.84 Grants will be awarded through 2013.85 Of the $100 
million, $10 million is to be used to carry out a national enrollment 
campaign,86 $10 million is to be used to award grants to Indian Health 
Service providers and urban Indian organizations,87 and $80 million is 
granted to other eligible entities, which may include: state, county, and 
local governments; community-based or faith-based organizations; 
schools; and federal safety net providers.88 The Centers for Medicaid 
and Medicare Services (CMS) administer the grants.89 CHIPRA provides 
that priority is given to entities proposing to target geographic areas: (1) 
with high rates of eligible but un-enrolled children residing in rural 
areas, (2) with racial and ethnic minorities and health disparity 
populations, and (3) that submit the most demonstrable evidence 
required.90 
To apply for these grants, eligible entities must: (1) demonstrate 
that they include members who have access to and credibility with 
ethnic or low-income populations in the communities; (2) provide 
evidence demonstrating that the entity has the ability to address barriers 
to enrollment, such as lack of awareness of eligibility, stigma concerns, 
or punitive fears associated with receipt of benefits; (3) give specific 
quality or outcome performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness 
of activities funded by a grant; and (4) provide assurances that the 
eligible entity will assess the effectiveness of the activities, cooperate 
with the collection and reporting of enrollment data, and, in the case of 
 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(g) (2006). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(a) (2006). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(a)(2) (2006). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(2) (2006). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(f) (2006). 
 89. CENTER FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH POLICY 
INST., AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHIPRA OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT GRANTS 1 
(2009), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file 
=ccf%20publications/federal%20S-CHIP%20policy/outreach%20grants%20final 
.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF GRANTS]. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(1) (2006). 
SADIGHI_PAGINATED.DOC 5/4/2010 6:19:48 PM 
2010 DENALI KIDCARE 113 
 
 
an eligible entity that is not the state, provide the state with enrollment 
data.91 
In announcing the grants, CMS provided that the purpose of the 
grants is not only to enroll un-enrolled eligible children but also to 
retain coverage as well.92 CMS has announced that it will award the 
grant funds in different rounds.93 The first round will provide up to $40 
million in two-year projects costing up to $1 million—CMS anticipates 
awarding around two hundred grants in this first round.94 
III.  HEALTH CARE IN ALASKA: BACKGROUND 
Many of Alaska’s health care problems result from its geographic 
location, its size, its scattered population, and its seasonal employment 
pattern. Relative to other states in the United States, Alaska has a very 
young population, proportionately fewer females, proportionately more 
Native people, and proportionately fewer African Americans.95 Alaska 
is very large—one-fifth the size of the rest of the United States—and is 
sparsely populated, with a population density of 1.07 persons per 
square mile.96 Because Alaska lacks a complete road system, air or sea 
travel is the primary way to reach most of the state.97 
Alaska relies on seasonal employment for much of its industry, 
including oil, timber, mining, fishing, and tourism.98 A higher 
percentage of Alaskans are seasonally employed than in other states.99 
As a result of the seasonal employment and the transitions in military 
personnel, large numbers of people are often in search of 
employment.100 
Because a majority of Alaska’s population resides in Anchorage, it 
is the only city in Alaska where specialized consultative services are 
available.101 Alaska has two military hospitals: one in Anchorage and 
one in Fairbanks.102 Smaller urban communities have access to 
community hospitals.103 
For rural Alaska, tribal health care is essentially the sole provider 
of health care services.104 There are five hospitals in hub communities 
for different regions.105 These hospitals send Alaska Native patients to 
 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(c)(1)–(4) (2006). 
 92. OVERVIEW OF GRANTS, supra note 89, at 2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at 6. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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the Native hospital located in Anchorage.106 Funded by the Indian 
Health Service, twelve Native Health corporations manage the services 
provided in more than two hundred villages in Alaska.107 With the help 
of a physician over the phone, community health aides—trained 
residents of a village—provide primary care and emergency services in 
their communities.108 The state provides maternal and child health to 
medically underserved areas through Public Health Nurses.109 Though 
there are some preferred provider arrangements, managed care is not 
thriving in Alaska;110 there are no health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) in the state.111 
Approximately 18,000 children in Alaska (nineteen percent of 
Alaska’s residents who are age eighteen or younger) are uninsured.112 
Private health care coverage for children has declined over thirty 
percent in the last ten years.113 Uninsured children with medical needs 
are five times more likely to not have a regular doctor than are insured 
children and are four times as likely to use emergency rooms, which are 
considerably more expensive than a regular visit to the doctor.114 
One major issue is that health insurance choices in Alaska are very 
limited—Premera Blue Cross alone constitutes sixty percent of the 
health insurance market share.115 The top two insurance providers in 
Alaska account for ninety-five percent of the total market share.116 This 
leads to expensive insurance policies. 
The Child and Adolescent Health Measurement Initiative ranked 
Alaska in the lowest group for percentage of children uninsured.117 The 
same study shows that in 2007, 18.5% of children lacked consistent 
insurance coverage in the previous year.118 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Medical Assistance Eligibility: Hearing on S.B. 13 Before the S. Comm. on 
Health & Soc. Servs., 26th Leg., 1st Sess., 5 (Alaska 2009), available at 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/26/M/SHSS2009-02-091334.pdf [hereinafter 
Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs.]. 
 113. Medical Assistance Eligibility: Hearing on S.B. 13 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 
26th Leg., 1st Sess., 9 (Alaska 2009), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/ 
pdf/26/M/SFIN2009-02-250903.pdf [hereinafter Hearing before S. Fin. Comm.]. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 5, at 7. 
 116. Id. 
 117. CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH MEASUREMENT INITIATIVE, 2007 NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH, http://nschdata.org/Rankings/RankingMap. 
aspx?item=07_ind3_1chbk (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 118. CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH MEASUREMENT INITIATIVE, 2007 NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH, http://www.nschdata.org/StateProfiles/ 
CustomProfile 07.aspx?rid=5&geo2=Nationwide&geo=Alaska (last visited Apr. 
10, 2010). 
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IV.  DENALI KIDCARE 
When establishing its CHIP, Alaska had the option to create a 
separate children’s health insurance plan, expand benefits under its 
Medicaid plan, or enact some combination of both.119 Alaska chose to 
expand benefits under its Medicaid plan and called the plan Denali 
KidCare.120 
A. Background 
Initially, Alaska expanded Medicaid eligibility to children up to 
age nineteen with families earning 200% of the Alaska Federal Poverty 
Guidelines (FPG) or less.121 But in 2003, Alaska reduced the eligibility to 
children with families earning 175% or less of the Alaska FPG.122 This 
meant that a family of four was ineligible if it earned more than $3555 
per month.123 By 2007, the eligibility level from 2003—175% of Alaska’s 
2003 FPG—had become the equivalent of 154% of the 2007 Alaska 
FPG.124 On July 12, 2007, Governor Sarah Palin signed legislation 
increasing the eligibility to 175% of the 2007 Alaska FPG.125 To prevent 
the eligibility level from falling in real terms, similar revisions occur 
annually.126 
To increase enrollment, the State, through the Department of 
Health and Social Services, attempted to separate the Medicaid 
eligibility determination from public assistance programs, and it 
engaged in expanded outreach efforts.127 These efforts were made to 
remove any negative stigmatization from the Medicaid program so it 
would not be considered a “welfare” program.128 There are now 
separate Medicaid administrative units making eligibility 
determinations.129 
Additional efforts were made to simplify the application process. 
For example, any necessary follow-up is now done by phone.130 
Furthermore, the asset test was eliminated, and continuous eligibility 
was simplified to ensure that children would remain insured.131 
 
 119. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
 120. See id. at 9–10. 
 121. Id. at 9. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES FOR CHILDREN, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 4 
(July, 2009), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/stateinitiatives 
forchildren1.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 9. 
 127. Id. at 10. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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Continuity of care is very important in Alaska because of the high 
percentage of the population that is seasonally employed.132 
Denali KidCare applications are widely available, especially in 
locations commonly visited by children and families.133 Additionally, 
relationships have been formed with state and local governments, 
schools, health care providers, tribes, and nonprofit organizations to 
further promote Denali KidCare and support for eligible families in the 
application process.134 Advertising has also been used to increase 
awareness of the program.135 Grants have greatly empowered outreach 
efforts, especially to Alaska Native communities, where Alaska Natives 
make up a disproportionate percentage of the un-enrolled Medicaid-
eligible population.136 
When Denali KidCare was first implemented, children enrolled in 
the program were given only six months of continuous eligibility.137 
This made it more difficult to ensure continuity of care and was 
cumbersome for families. But in April 2009, the continuous eligibility 
was raised from six months to twelve months,138 meaning as soon as a 
child is enrolled in Denali KidCare, he or she is guaranteed twelve 
months of coverage, regardless of changes in income, resources, family 
status, or household composition.139 The extension of continuous 
eligibility allows Alaska to meet one more of the eight criteria necessary 
to qualify for the performance bonus payments provided under 
CHIPRA.140 This change also allows increased efficiency and decreased 
administrative costs.141 
To further facilitate continuity and ease of application, Denali 
KidCare provides a preprinted renewal form, sent prior to eligibility 
expiring.142 Currently, the forms are sent to families with their 
information pre-completed and confirmation requested.143 An 
alternative renewal option, encouraged by CHIPRA, is to require a 
response to the pre-completed form only when income or other 
circumstances have changed.144 The latter may be the better option for 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 15. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See ALASKA TITLE XXI PROGRAM FACT SHEET 2, available at http://www. 
cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/AKCurrentFactsheet.pdf [here-
inafter FACT SHEET]. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
 140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 141. SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 8. 
 142. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS UNDER TITLE XXI OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ACT 7, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/downloads/ 
AK_FY2008CHIPAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See SULLIVAN, supra note 71, at 7–8. 
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Alaska because it will allow Alaska to receive performance bonus 
payments.145 
Because Denali KidCare is an entitlement program as a result of 
being an expansion of Medicaid, there is no incentive to fill out the 
forms on time.146 Limitations or restrictions on Denali KidCare cannot 
be imposed as a result of tardy renewal.147 Since a recipient under 
Medicaid can simply fill out an application whenever services are 
desired, there is no incentive to apply on time. Fear of delayed 
processing, however, may incentivize punctual application.148 
In order to increase enrollments in rural areas—areas without 
eligibility offices—the state is using a system of “Fee Agents.”149 Fee 
Agents are community members trained in eligibility issues and paid on 
a per-application basis, who assist people in the application process.150 
Denali KidCare does not provide presumptive eligibility for 
children.151 Retroactive eligibility is available—up to three months for 
qualifying families.152 Denali KidCare has a mail-in application, 
provides an application on its website, does not allow applications over 
the phone, and does not allow applications online.153 It does not require 
a face-to-face interview, but it requires children to be uninsured for a 
minimum amount of time prior to enrollment.154 
Denali KidCare serves an estimated 7900 Alaskan children155 and is 
one of the cheapest medical assistance programs in Alaska, costing 
approximately $1700 per child.156 It costs about twenty percent of what 
adult senior coverage costs.157 
B. Qualifying Income Eligibility Standard 
Alaska is one of only five states that funds its CHIP below 200% of 
the FPG.158 Forty-four states and Washington, D.C. cover children and 
families with incomes of 200% or higher of the FPG; thirty-three states 
cover children and families with incomes between 200% and 250% of the 
FPG; nineteen states and Washington, D.C. cover children and families 
with income of 250% or higher of the FPG, and ten of those states cover 
families with incomes of equal to or greater than 300% of the FPG.159 
 
 145. For a discussion of alternative options, see infra Part VI. 
 146. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 70. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. STATE CHILD HEALTH PLAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
 150. Id. 
 151. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 3. 
 152. Id. at 4. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 5. 
 155. Hearing before S. Fin. Comm., supra note 113, at 9. 
 156. Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112, at 4. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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C.  Raising the Eligibility Level 
For a family of four in Alaska, the poverty guideline for 2009 is 
$27,570.160 For a family to qualify for Denali KidCare, it must earn less 
than 175% of $27,570—that is, less than $48,247. The problem arises from 
the fact that of thirteen policies available to a family of four, the average 
price is $671.46 per month, or $8,057.52 per year.161 This means a family 
of four would be spending an average of seventeen percent of its income 
on health insurance. Even more problematic, a family of four earning 
151% of the Alaska FPG—that is, $41,355 per year—is too wealthy to 
qualify for Medicaid and thus would be spending as much as twenty 
percent of its yearly income on health insurance. Because of this 
problem, efforts are underway to raise the eligibility level. 
In January of 2009, Alaska State Senator Bettye Davis proposed 
Senate Bill No. 13 (S.B. 13).162 The purpose of S.B. 13 was to increase and 
restore the qualifying income eligibility standard for Denali KidCare to 
the original 200% level of the FPG, making health insurance accessible to 
an estimated 1300 more uninsured children and 225 pregnant women in 
Alaska.163 
Representatives Sharon Cissna and Max Gruenberg introduced 
House Bill No. 61 (H.B. 61) in January of 2009.164 This bill, like S.B. 13, 
sought to raise the eligibility to 200% of the FPG for uninsured children 
and pregnant women.165 However, H.B. 61 never made it out of the 
Health & Social Services and Finance Committees.166 During the same 
session, two additional House Bills introduced to increase the Denali 
KidCare eligibility level to 200% also failed to leave the Health & Social 
Services and Finance Committees.167 
Though Democrats introduced most of the bills, support for raising 
the eligibility level to at least 200% has support from both sides of the 
aisle. For example, former Governor Palin supported increasing the 
Denali KidCare eligibility to 200%.168 United States Senator Mark Begich 
(D-Alaska)—previously mayor of Anchorage—also believes that the 
 
 160. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199, 4200 
(Jan. 23, 2009). 
 161. See Blue Cross Blue Shield, Individual & Family Health Plans, 
https://pbcbsak.inshealth.com/ehi/Alliance?allid=Pre25315 (last visited Apr. 
10, 2010). This monthly cost was obtained from the Premera Blue Cross website, 
using a family of four with two adults (both aged thirty-three), and two children 
(ages four and five), on February 28, 2010. 
 162. S.B. 13, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009). 
 163. Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112, at 8. 
 164. H.B. 61, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009). 
 165. Id. at 4. 
 166. Legis. History for H.B. 26, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/ 
basis/get_complete_bill.asp?session=26&bill=HB61. 
 167. H.B. 62, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2009); H.B. 118, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Alaska 2009). 
 168. Press Release, Office of Alaska Governor (Dec. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/press/2008/Health_Priorities_120408.pdf. 
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eligibility level should be increased, but he believes it should be 
increased even higher than 200%.169 
The Alaska Commission on Aging (ACoA) also supported S.B. 
13.170 The ACoA believed that S.B. 13 would help the growing number 
of older Alaskans who take care of their grandchildren while living on 
fixed incomes.171 The ACoA cites a study showing that one in five senior 
households with a grandchild present is at risk of hunger, compared to 
one in twenty households without a grandchild present being at risk.172 
In supporting S.B. 13, the ACoA was trying to protect grandparent-
headed families that earned too much to qualify for Medicaid but not 
enough to pay the rising costs of insurance.173 
Additional support for raising the eligibility level came from the 
Governor’s Health Care Strategies Council, which recommended 
increasing the eligibility to 200% of the Alaska FPG.174 The Alaska 
Health Care Strategies Planning Council also recommended raising the 
eligibility standard from 175% to 200% of the FPG.175 
Though increasing the eligibility to 200% has a great deal of 
bipartisan support, some politicians believe it would be a bad policy 
choice.176 Some Alaskan state senators have expressed concern over an 
increase in costs and expenditures that would result from increasing the 
income eligibility. For example, Senator Con Bunde—who voted against 
S.B. 13—expressed his belief that “the state should work harder to 
REDUCE, rather than expand state subsidies, not just to DKid Care, but 
across the board.”177 He explained that Alaska has spent over $1 billion 
more than it has received, and that at such a rate, Alaska’s reserves 
would be depleted in three years.178 
Senator Fred Dyson’s chief of staff described some of the reasons 
why the senator had voted against S.B. 13. He explained that Senator 
Dyson was concerned about “committing the state to increased future 
outlays at a time when the state is facing deficit budgets for the next 
several years.”179 He did not want to “increase benefits to Alaskans one 
 
 169. Letter from Mark Begich, U.S. Senator, to Gary Stevens, Bert Stedman & 
Lyman Hoffman, Alaska Senators (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www. 
legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_documents.asp?session=26&docid=1294. 
 170. Letter from Denise Daniello, Executive Dir., Alaska Commission on 
Aging, to Members of the Alaska Senate (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http:// 
www.hss.state.ak.us/acoa/legislative/S.B.13.pdf. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 81. 
 175. ALASKA HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES PLANNING COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT 3 
(2007), available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/commissioner/legislature/pdf/ 
HCSPC_report.pdf. 
 176. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 81. 
 177. E-mail from Con Bunde, Senator, Alaska State Senate, to Author (July 16, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 178. Id. 
 179. E-mail from Lucky Shultz, Chief of Staff for Fred Dyson, Senator, Alaska 
State Senate, to Author (July 13, 2009) (on file with author). 
SADIGHI_PAGINATED.DOC 5/4/2010 6:19:48 PM 
120 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 27:1 
 
 
year . . . then reduce the benefit through budget cutting at a later 
date.”180 The state is having difficulties meeting its current obligations 
due to: (1) fears of increased funding necessary for higher and lengthier 
unemployment rates, (2) high costs of fuel in remote villages, and (3) the 
quickly growing group of seniors in Alaska.181 Ultimately, Senator 
Dyson claimed that it is “unconscionable” to “increase funding of one 
group of people who are already receiving funding, while . . . denying 
funds to Alaskans unable to meet immediate day-to-day costs to heat 
their home during an Alaskan winter, or to put food on the table to feed 
those same children, or to buy medicine for immediate needs . . . .”182 
Staff to Senator Therriault commented that the vote against S.B. 13 
came because of the concern that the legislation “will impose an 
unsustainable financial obligation on Alaska’s treasury and be 
politically difficult to take back if required to do so at a future date due 
to declined oil revenue.”183 The fear of declining oil prices is also 
causing apprehension toward expanding eligibility: oil prices need to 
average at least $57/bbl in order to break even with the fiscal year 2010 
budget. Currently, Alaska North Slope oil is trading around $60/bbl.184 
V.  TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF CHIPRA 
As expressed by the Alaska senators who voted against S.B. 13, 
costs and expenses associated with increasing the eligibility standard 
are the primary obstacles. These concerns are valid and legitimate 
because of the way Denali KidCare is currently set up. CHIPRA has 
provided mechanisms for states to be financially able to increase 
eligibility standards, but Alaska has not taken advantage of these 
mechanisms. Two such mechanisms are the performance bonus 
payments and outreach grants set up under CHIPRA. 
A. Performance Bonus Payments 
If Alaska’s enrollment in Medicaid exceeds the target and Alaska 
meets five of the eight criteria mentioned above, then Alaska will 
qualify for bonus payments. Alaska, however, only meets four of the 
eight criteria, disqualifying it from receiving the performance bonus 
payments. 
One criterion that Alaska could easily meet is the automatic 
renewal criterion.185 Alaska is not saving money by requiring responses 
to the renewal reminder. Of the cases that “auto-close”—meaning 
people fail to respond to the renewal reminder—renewal was around 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. E-mail from Ernest Prax, Staff of Gene Therriault, Senator, Alaska State 
Senate, to Author (July 10, 2009) (on file with author). 
 184. Id. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(4)(E) (2006). 
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thirty percent within thirty days of expiration.186 An even greater 
percentage renews their coverage after expiration within a six-month 
period.187 Presumably, even more will renew when care is necessary, so 
as to not have to pay out-of-pocket for their immediate medical 
expenses. 
Allowing automatic renewal—subject to notice that a family’s 
circumstances have changed—would not burden the State because so 
many families renew anyway. But the benefits to Alaska could be 
substantial if automatic renewal is provided. Automatic renewal is one 
of the eight criteria that qualify states for performance bonuses under 
CHIPRA; if Alaska were to adopt automatic renewal, it would meet five 
of the necessary criteria to qualify for the performance bonuses. Thus, 
the benefit of providing automatic renewal far outweighs any nominal 
costs associated with it. 
B. Outreach Grants 
Alaska could be a strong contender for receiving outreach grants 
established under CHIPRA. The priority regions for the outreach grants 
are those with high rates of children in rural areas who are unenrolled 
but eligible, as well as those regions with high percentages of racial and 
ethnic minorities.188 Approximately fifteen percent of the Alaskan 
population is Alaska Native or American Indian.189 According to Alaska 
Native Tribal Health Consortium research, this minority group could 
also be considered a “health disparity population” under CHIPRA.190 
The State of Alaska can demonstrate all of the necessary requirements to 
qualify for these grants:191 it has a history and has established 
relationships with the Alaska Native population; it has the ability to 
address barriers to enrollment (for example, the Alaska Native Tribal 
Health Consortium has made concerted education efforts); and the State 
has the capital and resources to measure quality and results. 
Presumably, a state would take advantage of essentially free 
federal money, especially when it has a CHIP fully in place. But the 
State of Alaska has decided not to apply for these outreach grants. The 
exact reasoning for not applying for these grants is unclear. The forgone 
benefits are, however, clear—by not applying, the State gives up the 
opportunity to receive a grant of $1 million, which could pay for half the 
 
 186. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 142, at 70. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(b)(1) (2006). 
 189. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, ALASKA QUICK FACTS (2009), http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 190. Alaska Native Health Status Report, Alaska Native Tribal Health 
Consortium, available at http://www.anthc.org/chs/epicenter/upload/ 
ANHSR.pdf. 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 1397mm(c)(1)–(4) (2006). 
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total cost of increasing the Denali KidCare eligibility level from 175% to 
200%.192 
In response to an inquiry as to why the State decided not to apply 
for the outreach grants, the commissioner of the Department of Health 
and Social Services wrote, “[W]e have chosen to support our community 
partners in their efforts. We will continue to work with them to identify 
and support their outreach strategies, particularly those that ensure that 
those kids and families most in need are enrolled in the program.”193 
Admittedly, the State’s application would discourage other 
organizations from applying for the grants. However, the breadth of the 
state government and its available capital make it the best user of these 
grants—especially when the grants could help the State afford to cover 
more children under Denali KidCare. 
C. Providing Insurance Can Save Money 
In the context of Denali KidCare, it is possible that providing low-
income children with health insurance will save Alaska money in the 
long run. Uninsured children with a medical need are five times more 
likely not to have a regular doctor, and four times as likely to use 
emergency rooms—which are considerably more expensive than a 
routine visit to the doctor.194 
It is argued that insured children are less expensive to the State 
than uninsured children. Politicians of all ranks and affiliations posit 
that preventive care saves money in the long run. Former Senator John 
Edwards (D-N.C.) stated, “Study after study shows that primary and 
preventive care greatly reduces future health care costs, as well as 
increasing patients’ health.”195 Former Governor Mike Huckabee (R-
Ark.) has said that preventive care “would save countless lives, pain 
and suffering . . . and billions of dollars.”196 But it may not be so simple. 
In order to determine whether preventive care will save money, 
cost-benefit analyses must be done for each type of treatment to 
determine which methods of preventive care will result in cost 
savings.197 Denali KidCare could greatly benefit from research detailing 
whether the treatments received by low-income children in the program 
result in cost savings. Other states have done similar research for their 
respective CHIPs and have made optimistic projections for their 
programs’ cost savings. 
 
 192. OVERVIEW OF GRANTS, supra note 89, at 2. 
 193. E-mail from William Hogan, Commissioner, Alaska Department of 
Health and Social Services, to author (July 20, 2009) (on file with author). 
 194. Hearing before S. Fin. Comm., supra note 113, at 9. 
 195. Joshua T. Cohen, Peter J. Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Does 
Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the Presidential Candidates, 358 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 661, 661 (2008). 
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Texas, for example, investigated increasing costs for its CHIP in 
2001. The Texas Legislative Budget Board—charged with writing the 
official cost estimates for legislation—estimated that Texas would save 
$4.6 billion over the course of ten years, and $10 billion over the course 
of twenty years from “reduced emergency room use, reduced hospital 
days, increased immunizations, and reduced charity care.”198 Assuming 
its situation is similar to Texas’, Alaska could experience great savings 
by increasing eligibility to 200%. 
D. Costs Are Low 
Relative to Alaska’s 2009 budget—$10.1 billion199—increasing 
Denali KidCare’s eligibility level to 200% would not have a drastic effect 
on the budget. The total cost of increasing the eligibility level to 200% 
would be around $2.7 million, which is approximately 0.03% of the 
fiscal year 2010 budget.200 Additionally, the State of Alaska would not be 
paying the entirety of those costs, as the federal government matches 
the costs with the allotted funds at the enhanced FMAP rate. 
With the enhanced FMAP, CHIP is a much cheaper way to fund 
health insurance programs for children. United States Senator Mark 
Begich called Denali KidCare “frankly a very good deal.”201 Senator 
Begich was referring to the enhanced FMAP, which for Alaska is at 
sixty-six percent—compared to the FMAP for Medicaid, which is at 
fifty-one percent.202 This means that of the $2.7 million in additional 
costs incurred by increasing the eligibility level, the State of Alaska 
would only be paying thirty-three percent of the total cost, or a mere 
$900,000. This $900,000 amounts to 0.0089% of the annual budget. 
Alaska would be insuring 1300 additional children for only $692 per 
child, per year; or $58 per child, per month. 
Before CHIPRA, the federal government would have allocated 
Alaska $10.4 million to fund Denali KidCare for fiscal year 2009.203 
CHIPRA increased this allocation by over 200% with around $24 million 
 
 198. ANNE DUNKELBERG, CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRIORITIES, STATUS REPORT: 
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 199. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STATE OF ALASKA, FISCAL 2010 
ENACTED FISCAL SUMMARY (2009), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/omb/ 
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 200. See Hearing before S. Comm. on Health & Soc. Servs, supra note 112. 
 201. See Letter from Mark Begich, supra note 169, at 2. 
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FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGES AND ENHANCED FEDERAL MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGES FY 2009—FY 2011 (2009), available at http://ccf. 
georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=policy/financing/fmap.pdf. 
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ESTIMATED ALLOTMENTS UNDER CHIPRA 2009 (2009), available at http://ccf. 
georgetown.edu/index/cms-filesystem-action?file=policy/2009S-CHIPreauth/ 
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allotted from the federal government.204 Before the increase in CHIPRA 
allotments, Denali KidCare served around 7900 children.205 With an 
increase from the 175% eligibility to 200% eligibility, it is estimated that 
an additional 1300 children will be covered;206 this would be an increase 
of approximately sixteen percent. The increased allocation under 
CHIPRA of over 200% to $24 million more than covers the cost of 
enrolling an additional sixteen percent of children in Denali KidCare if 
the eligibility is increased. Therefore, budgetary pressures are not a 
compelling reason for not supporting an increase in the eligibility. 
CONCLUSION 
A man is drowning in the ocean. He prays for God to help him. 
God does not respond. A small fishing boat approaches the man, and 
offers to save him. The man says no, for he is a man of faith, and God 
will save him. He continues to pray, and still no response from God. A 
second vessel—a ship with a life raft—approaches the man, and tries to 
save him. Yet the man denies rescue again: he is a man of faith, and God 
will save him. The man is near death when the Coast Guard finally 
arrives with a helicopter to save him. With the little life he has left, he 
avoids and denies the rescue: for he is a man of faith, and God will save 
him. The man died. In the next life, he found himself conversing with 
God; and out of curiosity, he asked God why God did not decide to save 
such a staunch believer. God responded: “I tried to save you three times; 
I sent you a boat, a ship, and a helicopter, yet you denied them all.” 
Alaska is being sent a boat, a ship, and a helicopter. For some 
reason, though, it continues to deny rescue. Alaska is rejecting the 
opportunity to insure an additional 1300 children for the mere price of 
$58 per child, per month. It is rejecting the opportunity to insure an 
additional 1300 children for the price of 0.0089% of its annual budget. 
The federal government is providing lifeboats in the form of 
performance bonus payments and outreach grants, yet Alaska is 
rejecting those too. 
Alaska is known for many great and distinct attributes, but the 
Alaska Legislature should no longer allow the state to be known for 
being one of five states limiting CHIP eligibility to less than 200%. 
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 206. Hearing before S. Comm. On Health & Soc. Servs., supra note 112, at 8. 
